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In Algeria, privatization reflects the contradictory forces that
have characterized the progress – or often the lack of progress –
in the reform movement. |
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hen
the privatization process was initiated in 1994, it was in the
context of a severe balance of payments crisis. Algeria was bailed
out by the IMF on the condition that the country’s authorities
genuinely engage wide-reaching structural reform and begin in
truth the complex transition from a planned economy, dominated by
the public sector, to a market economy in which the private sector
is the engine of growth. The truth of these words was graphically
demonstrated by the 1994 crisis: Algeria was no longer able to
afford to fund its massive public sector, which, debt-ridden and
inefficient, was a bottomless pit that no amount of pump priming
would solve. |
However,
despite the financial realities driving the push for privatization,
there has been intense opposition from all sectors of society. Public
sector industry makes up the majority of the state’s saleable assets
and is the country’s largest – and most inefficient – employer.
Algeria’s large labor unions are fearful of lost jobs while, in the
volatile world of Algerian politics, the government is afraid of
adding to its indigent army of disaffected unemployed. Unemployment in
Algeria is acute: currently standing at approximately 30% of the
population and 50% among young people.
Resistance also comes from higher up. The complex administrative and
legal apparatus of government ownership has created a bureaucratic
class whose jobs and privileges depend on the continuity of the
system. But perhaps most difficult of all, powerful elites within the
government and the military, many of whom have become rich on the back
of state-controlled monopolies and a subservient banking system, have
operated behind the scenes to obstruct the process.
Given this environment, the progress that has been made to date is not
insignificant. Since the decree legalizing privatization in 1995, the
authorities have opened almost every sector to private activity,
including banking, agriculture, mining, tourism, telecommunications
and industry. The lucrative hydrocarbons and energy sectors – the
final bastion of state control – are also facing a draft law for
liberalization that will be passed in 2002.
STATUS:
NUMBER OF PRIVATIZATION AGREEMENTS BY 2001*:
NUMBER OF STATE FIRMS LIQUIDATED:
NUMBER OF PARTNERSHIP AGREEMENTS
AS OF 2000 (outside hydrocarbons sector):
TOTAL VALUE: |
Legal since
1995
1
approx. 1,000
153
$200 million |
*From the list of 88 companies selected by the government
in 1998 that needed to be privatized |
The poor results of the privatization
process should be improved thanks to a new privatization law passed in
2001, which does away with some of the bureaucratic obstacles and
makes the decision-making process more streamlined. Says the Minister
in charge of the process, Mr. Nourredine Boukrouh, “Our record of
achievement is weak, but we are capable of getting a lot done this
year. We are reaching the point of no return.”
WHAT’S PROMISING
SIDER, one the country’s largest iron and steel
producers and heavily in debt at the end of the 1990s, has negotiated
a deal with India’s ISPAT – one of the world’s largest iron and steel
producers – to take control of 70% of SIDER’s capital. If concluded,
it will represent Algeria’s first full privatization deal.
WHAT’S NOT
The Algiers Stock Exchange. Three state-owned
companies were ordered to list 20% of their shares on the newly
created bourse in 1999. Aside from a Sonatrach bond issue, there has
been no activity since.
The legal framework for the privatization process is in line with most
privatization codes around the world: it provides a flexible,
negotiable context in which most modes of privatization are available,
from a straight sale of assets, to the sale of shares through a
competitive bidding process, the stock exchange or private deals. It
also provides for a subscription of shares by private investors in the
context of a capital increase and concessions.
The
government’s repeated objective
for these actions is not privatization per se. Its overriding concern
is to modernize Algeria’s productive capacity so that, one, it erodes
the country’s excessive reliance on hydrocarbon exports and, two, that
it will actually reduce the level of unemployment, not increase it.
What the government stated it wouldn’t do was continue the long-term
funding of its companies anymore, which left Algeria’s SOEs to look
elsewhere for cash, ie: open up their equity to the private sector.
The official body set up to manage this process was the National
Council for State Participations (CNPE), under which 11 holding
companies (subsequently reorganized into five national and five
regional holdings in 2000) were created according to sector to manage
the state’s assets – approximately 950 national enterprises and 350
local or regional enterprises. Their task was to prepare SOEs for
privatization and/or partnership or liquidate the worst cases.
The problem
is that
after seven years with this administrative framework, not much has
actually happened in terms of real privatization. According to the
Ministry of Participation and Coordination of Reforms, around 1,000
small state-companies have so far been liquidated, resulting in the
loss of 36,000 jobs. In a stage-managed affair, three state-owned
companies were directed to list 20% of their shares on the newly
created Algiers Stock Exchange in 1999. (Despite lively interest in
these initial IPOs, no activity on the new exchange has taken place
since.) Finally, a detergents company, the National Company for
Detergent Products, has formed a joint venture with Henkel, the German
consumer products manufacturer.
Otherwise, no real majority privatization has taken place. To speed
things up, the Minister of Participation, Mr. Hamid Temmar, called for
the outright elimination of the government holdings as they were, in
his view, cumbersome intermediaries between company managers and
possible investors. In what many saw as a struggle between pro- and
anti-privatization forces, Mr. Temmar was moved to the Ministry of
Trade in 2001, his reforms to streamline procedures left undone.
However, his replacement, Mr. Nouredine Boukrouh, formerly the
Minister in charge of SMEs, has succeeded in implementing much of Mr.
Temmar’s proposals. A presidential decree, issued in August last year,
shut down the holdings, eliminated the National Council of
Privatization (another intermediary body) and streamlined the CNPE,
renamed the State Participation’s Council (CPE). In the place of the
holding companies will be 28 equity management companies that will
have, in theory, greater powers to deal directly with investors and
more room to maneuver.
“What characterizes the new process,” says Mr. Boukrouh, “is that all
intermediate structures – the holding system, the National Council of
Privatization, the secretariat – have been liquidated. Instead we have
made the institutional process more practical by shortening the
decision-making route.”
On the investment front, the National Agency for Investment
Development (ANDI) was created to replace the former investment
agency, APSI. Mr. Abdelmajid Baghdadli, the new agency’s General
Director, says the brief is to get closer to the investor. “ANDI will
be organized through a decentralized, regional network of ‘one-stop
shops’ where investors will find a unique agent to help and support
them for all their needs.” Initially, the agency will be providing
updated analysis and information on Algeria’s investment environment,
then branch out into services to support the specific needs of a
particular investor. |